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This publication discusses the decentralization issues faced by countries of Asia and the 
Pacific. It includes practical suggestions on how to proceed in this area to achieve economic 
growth, macroeconomic stability, poverty and income distribution, services delivery 
improvements, and political accountability. This note elaborates on adequacy of local 
revenues and autonomy, expenditure management and clear service delivery mandates, 
horizontal imbalances and limited use of incentives in intergovernmental transfers, financing 
needs and local government borrowing, and local management capacities as the major 
challenges in a decentralized fiscal architecture. The recommendations to address the above 
challenges also note the long-term nature of these reforms. 
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1Introduction
Decentralization reform continues to play a prominent role in Asia after being on the public policy agenda for several decades. As has happened in other countries around the world, the roles and expectations for subnational governments have increased substantially in 
most Asian countries since the 1990s. Currently subnational governments face a range of 
challenges, including the global financial and economic crisis, rapid urbanization and demographic 
changes, and environmental challenges and climate change, all of which increase the level of 
difficulty for effective service delivery.
Although decentralization reform has been an evolving process, this process has not been linear, 
and it has often been subject to moves toward recentralization. For example, in 2009 Pakistan 
dissolved local governments and elected mayors, replacing them with appointed officials. But 
at any rate the decentralization process continues to be a dynamic one in many Asian countries. 
For example, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) there is a shift of emphasis from economic 
development toward quality public services offered by subnational governments and greater 
geographical equity to “build a harmonious society,” while in Indonesia, property taxes are finally 
being decentralized and the basic laws from the “Big Bang” reforms of 1999–2001 are being 
overhauled. In Japan, the government continues to implement the “Trinity Reforms” to provide 
greater subnational fiscal autonomy; in Viet Nam progress has been steady and considerable but 
challenges remain in terms of fiscal autonomy and political and administrative decentralization 
at the lower levels; and in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Nepal there is 
renewed interest in building sound systems of intergovernmental finance.1
1 This note draws upon recent information in Blane Lewis and Bob Searle, Asia-Pacific in Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul 
Smoke (eds.) Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy (GOLD), 2010; United Cities and Local 
Governments.
2The Centrality of the Fiscal 
System
For subnational governments in Asian countries to meet their responsibilities and deal with the challenges they will be facing in the future, there will be a need to strengthen their intergovernmental fiscal systems in the following areas:
(i) expenditure assignment and management,
(ii) local revenue generation and autonomy,
(iii) intergovernmental transfers, and
(iv) local government borrowing and investment finance.
This fundamental task is the main focus of this note. However, we must make it clear that other 
institutional components also will need to be in place, including administrative decentralization 
and political decentralization. The lack of strong, politically decentralized institutions continues to 
be a challenge in a significant number of Asian countries.
3The Extent of Decentralization 
in the Region
If the extent of decentralization is measured by using the standard criterion of the share of subnational governments in total expenditures (Table 1), many Asian countries exhibit among the highest levels of decentralization in the world. Compare these with, for example, Australia 
and New Zealand (Table 2). Also, there is great diversity in the region, with East Asia way ahead 
of South Asia and Southeast Asia (Table 3).
We find that 70% of total expenditures are allocated at the subnational level in the PRC, 66% in 
India, 60% in Japan, and 45% in both the Republic of Korea and Viet Nam. Measured by the share 
of subnational governments in total revenues, the level of decentralization is lower, but still quite 
substantial, at 40% in both the PRC and Japan, 35% in Viet Nam, and 33% in India. Note that the 
vertical distribution also differs quite considerably across countries. Lower tiers are predominant 
(versus upper tiers) in Indonesia, Japan, and the PRC. In India they are balanced at 33% for upper 
and lower tiers in the case of expenditures (but not at all in the case of revenues). 
However, all of these figures need to be interpreted with caution since the actual levels of 
expenditure and revenue autonomy can be quite different from what is actually reported. For 
example, as noted above, expenditure shares in India are balanced at 33% for upper and lower 
tiers, but in reality lower tier governments in most Indian states have very little expenditure 
autonomy from their state governments. Another example is the case of Viet Nam, where 
despite the fact that subnational governments have a 35% share of total revenues, none of 
these governments have discretion to change tax rates or any other aspect of the taxes assigned 
to them.
Table 1 Estimated Subnational Government Shares of Total Public Expenditure 
and Revenue in Asian Countries, 2009 (%)
Country
Share of Total Public Expenditure Share of Total Public Revenue
Subnational Upper Tier Lower Tier Subnational Upper Tier Lower Tier
Bangladesh 15.0 5.0 10.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
India 66.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 30.0 3.0
Indonesia 35.0 7.0 28.0 8.0 5.5 2.5
Japan 60.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 20.0 20.0
Korea,  
Republic of 45.0 15.0 30.0 25.0 10.0 15.0
Pakistan 33.0 28.0 5.0 7.0 6.5 0.5
Philippines 25.0 11.0 14.0 10.0 2.5 7.5
continued on next page
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Table 2 Estimated Subnational Government Shares of Total Public Expenditure 
and Revenue in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries,  
2009 (%)
Country
Share of Total Public Expenditure Share of Total Public Revenue
Subnational Upper Tier Lower Tier Subnational Upper Tier Lower Tier
Australia 36.0 30.0 6.0 20.0 17.0 3.0
New  
Zealand 9.0 n/a 9.0 8.0 n/a 8.0
n/a = not applicable.
Source: Blane Lewis and Bob Searle. 2010. Asia-Pacific. In Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul Smoke (eds.) Second Global 
Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 2010; United Cities and Local Governments.
Table 3 Estimated Subnational Government Shares of Total Public Expenditure 
and Revenue across Continents, 2009 (%)
Local Revenues as Percentage 
of Total Public Revenues
Local Expenditures as Percentage 
of Total Public Expenditures
Africa 3.2 7.9
Asia
  South Asia 1.5 16.0
  East Asia 20.0 40.0
  Southeast Asia 5.3 15.5
Eurasia n/a 26.5
Europe (2008) 13.0 23.9
Latin America 4.0 11.1
Middle East and Western Asia n/a 4.6
North America 17.8 26.8
n/a = not applicable.
Source: Blane Lewis and Bob Searle. 2010. Asia-Pacific. In Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul Smoke (eds.) Second Global 
Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 2010; United Cities and Local Governments.
Country
Share of Total Public Expenditure Share of Total Public Revenue
Subnational Upper Tier Lower Tier Subnational Upper Tier Lower Tier
PRC 70.0 20.0 50.0 40.0 15.0 25.0
Thailand 10.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
Viet Nam 45.0 30.0 15.0 35.0 25.0 10.0
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Blane Lewis and Bob Searle. 2010. Asia-Pacific. In Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Paul Smoke (eds.) Second Global 
Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy. 2010; United Cities and Local Governments.
Table 1 continued
5Main Issues and Challenges 
in the Fiscal Architecture
Adequacy of local revenues and autonomy. Significant vertical fiscal imbalances are present in 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, and at the local level in the Philippines, the PRC, and Viet Nam. 
In addition, revenue autonomy is low outside Japan and the Republic of Korea, and much less 
in Indonesia and the Philippines. More autonomy, but only at the provincial level, exists in India, 
Pakistan, and the PRC. Problems with the property tax are also prevalent; for example, in Indonesia 
and the Philippines it is still a central tax. There is also inadequate diversification of the local tax 
base, and in the Republic of Korea, a multiplicity of nuisance taxes exists, while in Cambodia 
assignments from 2001 were never implemented. A relative neglect of fees and user charges is 
also encountered, with some exceptions. Problems balancing local and central roles in revenue 
collections exist in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan (central and provincial), the PRC, and Viet Nam (all 
central).
Expenditure management and service delivery. A lack of clarity in expenditure assignments is 
quite prevalent; this is more of a problem in the Republic of Korea and Thailand, and in India at the 
state–local level. This is much less of a problem in Japan. Inappropriate expenditure assignments 
are also problematic, for example, “unemployment and social insurance schemes” in the PRC 
assigned at the local level. Unfunded expenditure mandates are a growing issue in Bangladesh, 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, and the Philippines.
Budget discretion. Sufficient budget discretion is an issue in Indonesia and Viet Nam, but not in 
Japan or the Philippines. The continued use of off-budget operations in the PRC continues to be 
a problem, and previous budget approval and control by higher level authorities is an important 
issue in Bangladesh and the PRC (at the subprovincial level). In Viet Nam, provincial governments 
have almost complete control over local government. Incentives for local expenditure efficiency 
are lacking, and generally the quality of public services is quite low, outside Japan and the Republic 
of Korea. 
Intergovernmental transfers. Throughout the entire region, heavy reliance and dependence on 
transfers and revenue sharing can be found. In addition, there is a lack of attention to horizontal 
fiscal imbalances and the design of equalization grants: the PRC, despite very large fiscal disparities 
across provinces and local governments, still implements trivial equalization grants. Complex 
conditional or specific transfer designs are also found, for example, in the Republic of Korea 
and Thailand. Also, there is only limited use of incentives-innovative transfer mechanisms (e.g., 
performance-based grants). India has introduced incentives for budget performance; the Republic 
of Korea offers traditional conditional grants; and Japan and to some extent Bangladesh have 
incentives for tax effort. In Indonesia they have been discontinued. In the Philippines there are 
transfer intercepts for loan repayment. Viet Nam is using local service scorecards. 
Local government borrowing and investment finance. Local government borrowing and fiscal 
responsibility frameworks are lacking or problematic. In India borrowing takes place to cover 
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current budget deficits and is common at all levels of government; in the PRC, local governments 
are not allowed to borrow but their actual debt levels threaten instability; and in Japan subnational 
debt is one-third of gross domestic product. Local governments, such as those in Cambodia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand, often have poor and unreliable access to credit. Special intermediate 
institutions to lend to local governments are rare; the Philippines is an exception. Central bailouts 
are not a problem so far; automatic intercepts of transfer funds are used in only a few countries. 
Low revenue autonomy is not conducive to borrowing.
Management capacity. Variations in management capacity are large in the region. Several 
countries exhibit excellent to good quality tax administration and expenditure management: 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and to a slightly lesser extent the PRC and Viet Nam. Subnational tax 
administration and expenditure management show inefficiencies in countries like Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, but several reforms are under way. India and Pakistan have a weak tax 
administration at the subnational level. Expenditure management practices are also generally weak, 
even with the secondment of central government employees. At the bottom we have Bangladesh 
with rather weak and sometimes corrupt tax administration implemented in a deconcentrated 
fashion. Does a genuine desire to decentralize exist? There is a need to clarify legislation and 
development of local government in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, and 
Sri Lanka. In Malaysia, the “One Malaysia” policy has led to centralization.
7The Way Forward
Different countries in the region are at different levels of development and refinement of their decentralized fiscal frameworks. The recommendations that follow, therefore, apply to different countries to different extents, covering a broad range of development, from 
very nascent stages to those which only require refinements.
An Agenda for Reforming Expenditure Assignment and Management
A clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities should be at the top of national reform agendas 
for local government finance. The following topics must be addressed:
(i) Exclusive responsibilities must be identified.
(ii) For concurrent competencies specific responsibilities for various aspects—regulation, 
financing, and implementation—must be assigned.
(iii) Higher level controls on local expenditures must be appropriately limited.   
(iv) With limited administrative capacity, asymmetric assignments between central and local 
governments should be considered.
(v) Methods to translate responsibilities into expenditure needs and financing requirements 
should be developed.
(vi) Unfunded mandates must be avoided. 
(vii) Funding and staffing of deconcentrated offices of line ministries should be downscaled or 
eliminated if services are devolved.
(viii) Implementation of expenditure decentralization needs to be strategic (capacity building 
and technical assistance). 
An Agenda for Improving Local Revenue Generation and Autonomy
The overarching goal should be to increase reliance on own revenues with meaningful discretion. 
In addition
(i) reforming and modernizing property tax administration must be a priority; and
(ii) diversifying subnational tax bases:
a) avoiding nuisance taxes and economic distortions;
b) creating a shortlist of other good local taxes: vehicle taxes, business license taxes, and 
betterment levies on real estate;
c) implementing business taxes which offer opportunities (using sales turnover as a proxy, 
but avoiding conflict with national value-added taxes);
d) furthering local tax autonomy through introduction of a local “piggyback” personal 
income tax with a flat rate and possibly payroll taxes; and
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e) Implementing “green” taxes related to waste management, water- and air-polluting 
activities, and the production of energy.
An Agenda for Reforming Intergovernmental Transfers
Reforming intergovernmental transfers has several requirements. Among them are the following:
(i) assuring predictable, regular, and transparent transfer mechanisms;
(ii) securing an appropriate balance among the various types of transfers (using separate 
instruments for separate goals);
(iii) expanding and improving the use of equalization transfers based on a formula using 
measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and introducing an explicit rule for 
the pool of funds to be distributed determining the source in origin (fraternal—or 
contributions by richer jurisdictions versus vertical—or contributions by the central 
government, and in the latter case, also determining the amount as a percentage of 
central government revenues);
(iv) reviewing and improving mechanisms for allocating resources under conditional grants 
(rule based as opposed to discretionary);
(v) consolidating specific grants where large numbers of poorly coordinated programs exist 
into fewer “block” grants—providing larger but still conditional discretion to subnational 
governments;
(vi) implementing performance-based grants for encouraging budget process reforms and 
improvements in service delivery; and
(vii) rationalizing capital grants (what is being pursued) and coordinating with borrowing 
policies.
Local Government Borrowing and Investment Finance
To varying degrees, many countries in Asia, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, allow for 
local government borrowing within a regulated framework. Prudent, fiscally responsible local 
government borrowing needs to be promoted in many countries in the region. Legal and 
regulatory frameworks for local government borrowing need to be strengthened in places such 
as the PRC. Options and support mechanisms for local government borrowing must be expanded, 
including support, where appropriate, to intermediate financial institutions or municipal 
development funds (such as in the Philippines). Given the needs for public infrastructure, other 
financing mechanisms should have wider adoption (tax increment financing, betterment levies 
[valorization], and public–private partnerships).
Better Framing of Institutional Reform
The reforms above should be reinforced by other measures of an institutional nature:
(i) Strengthen regular and systematic dialogue between subnational governments and the 
central government on intergovernmental financial policy. 
The Way Forward 9 
(ii) Address government fragmentation and address existing scale-vs.-representation issues 
(Bangladesh with five levels, and very high fragmentation in Thailand).
(iii) Where deconcentrated units coexist with decentralized governments, identify the right 
roles for and interactions between deconcentrated and devolved government entities.
(iv) Rethink the role of parallel institutions (social funds, etc.) to subnational units and try to 
limit them and incorporate them into the main subnational government stream.
10
Concluding Thoughts
Each country is unique; the basic reform principles aforementioned need to be tailored to the economic, political, fiscal and social realities of individual countries. While there is no point in pursuing reforms that are politically infeasible, it is also important to strengthen horizontal 
accountability and make decisions about reform based on good information and evidence. There 
is considerable value-added to regional and global cooperation, sharing experiences, and learning 
by doing, in pursuing subnational finance reform.  
Governments in the region should invest in building subnational administrative capacity, especially 
at the local level.
It needs to be recognized that getting decentralization right can take quite some time, and the 
process is almost never a linear one because of its high level of political content. Even when 
institutions which are decentralized from fiscal, administrative, and political perspectives are 
working well, we should expect these institutions to evolve and change over time. Decentralization 
is a continuous process, and not a stage that once reached remains immutable.
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